We should be wary of removing the ECB from the troika to facilitate the use of outright monetary transactions by Otero-Iglesias, Miguel
Mario Draghi, Credit: European Central Bank (CC-BY-SA-ND-NC-3.0)
19/01/2015
We should be wary of removing the ECB from the troika to
facilitate the use of outright monetary transactions
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/01/19/we-should-be-wary-of-removing-the-ecb-from-the-troika-to-facilitate-the-use-of-outright-monetary-transactions/
A key legal debate in the context of the Eurozone crisis is whether so called ‘Outright Monetary
Transactions’(OMT), which would allow the European Central Bank (ECB) to buy unlimited numbers
of government bonds in secondary markets, are compatible with European law. The latest
development in this debate came last week when one of the Advocates General of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ), Pedro Cruz Villalón, stated that in principle OMT would be legal under the
correct conditions, which include removing the ECB from the ‘troika’ which oversees ﬁnancial
support to Eurozone countries. Miguel Otero Iglesias writes that while the ECJ is not expected to
give a full ruling until the autumn, political leaders should be cautious about removing the ECB from
the troika without creating a new institution capable of ﬁlling its role.
Finally there is some good news for the Eurozone. An Advocate General of the European Union’s Court of Justice
(ECJ) – the Spaniard, but European in its duty, Pedro Cruz Villalón– has declared that the Outright Monetary
Transactions (OMT) programme of the ECB (which gives it the power to buy in unlimited amounts government
bonds in the secondary markets) might be legal, under certain conditions. The use of the conditional here is
important because the ‘opinion’of an Advocate General of the ECJ is only a recommendation and hence, although in
90 per cent of the cases the ECJ follows the advice, it is not legally binding.
The ECJ, which has its headquarters in Luxembourg, will publish its verdict in autumn. If it follows the
recommendation of Cruz Villalón (and later the German Constitutional Court – which doubted the legality of OMT in
the ﬁrst place – accepts this decision) it would be a big step towards the “irreversibility”of the euro. The OMT saved
the common currency at the peak of the Eurozone crisis in summer 2012 when Spain (which was too big to fail and
too big to be rescued) asked the European Stability Mechanism for a 100 billion euros rescue credit line to bail out
its banking system.
Shortly after, in July 2012, Mario Draghi stated his
much-cited phrase that the ECB will do “whatever it
takes”to save the euro, and after the summer, he
outlined the conditionality attached to the OMT
programme. The countries who would require OMT
purchases would need to negotiate a rescue
programme with the ESM and accept the reform
plans drawn out and supervised by the troika (in other
words, they would need to give up part of their
economic sovereignty).
On top of this conditionality, the ECJ´s Advocate
General now adds his own conditions, which are all
controversial and will spark considerable debate.
First, the use of OMT needs to be proportional (an
ambiguous term that will trigger an intense debate
between lawyers and economists). Second, the ECB
needs to provide a proper legal and detailed
reasoning for the support (this might be advisable, but
1/2
sometimes to avoid market panic a central bank cannot disclose all that it knows). Finally, if an OMT programme
ﬁnally takes place, the ECB cannot be part of the troika.
This makes a lot of sense. The ECB is the only institution in charge of monetary policy, and in this realm both
European and national –even German –judges should restrain themselves from interfering because they lack the
necessary expertise and experience in this domain, Cruz Villalón argues. But when it comes to economic policy the
ECB has no competence whatsoever, thus it should not be at the negotiating table as part of the troika in front of the
democratic representatives of the Eurozone member states in ﬁnancial need.
However, banning the ECB from the troika can be problematic. First of all, ﬁscal, economic and monetary policies
are not watertight compartments. This is the reason why in the US the secretary of the Treasury and the governor of
the Federal Reserve meet on a regular basis. Excluding the ECB’s expertise from the troika short-changes it.
Especially after the creation of the Single Supervisor, the Eurosystem is the institution that is best informed about
the state of the ﬁnancial sector in a given country, and thus it can hardly be a good idea to exclude its input. Is it
possible to assess the state of an economy, and what to do to ﬁx it, without taking into account the credit system?
Certainly not. Europe should avoid falling into the trap of becoming too legalistic and dogmatic about how to best
deploy its macroeconomic policy.
The second concern is that throughout the Eurozone crisis the ECB has been the only institution which has taken a
truly European perspective. As a matter of fact, the IMF is not a European institution and the Commission has all too
often done the bidding of the most powerful member states such as France and Germany. Undoubtedly, the ECB
lacks the democratic legitimacy necessary to decide on the economic policies of member states, and this needs to
be remedied. But does the IMF, the Commission, the ESM, or even the Eurogroup have this legitimacy? Again, not
really.
The reality is that because the Eurozone does not have a democratically legitimised European treasury – which
should do the job of supervising the rescue programmes – the ECB has been forced to ﬁll the gap. The solution,
therefore, cannot be to take the ECB out of the picture without creating a legitimate institution to fulﬁl that necessary
role.
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